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“Whiskey’s for drinkin’. Water’s for fightin’ over.”1 Commonly though mistak-
enly attributed to Mark Twain, this quote is often used to describe water politics in 
the Southwest United States and the history of conflict that they have endured.2 As 
increasingly scarce resources attempt to satisfy the needs of a growing population, 
states are forced to collaborate more and more in their attempt to divide resources.3 
One landmark attempt at compromise was the creation of the Colorado River Com-
pact.4 In 1922, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wy-
oming entered into the Colorado River Compact (“Compact”), which was approved 
by Congress.5 In the Compact, they agreed to an equitable division and appropriation 
of water from the Colorado River System.6 The agreement divided the River System 
into the “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin,” and allocated rights to each basin based 
on water levels in 1922.7  
Each basin was allocated 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per year, “which shall in-
clude all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist.”8 The 
Compact further allocated water rights by states, dividing the participating states into 
the “Upper Division” and the “Lower Division.” While the Upper Division consists 
of Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah, the Lower Division is Comprised of 
California, Arizona, and Nevada.9 More than simply governing the water allocation 
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between these states, the Compact provided that Mexico would receive the surplus 
water that was not previously allocated to the states in the agreement.10 As a compact, 
the agreement has properties of both a statute and a contract.11  
Unfortunately, the shortsighted calculation of water levels in 1922 did not ac-
count for the effect of future droughts. This is particularly troubling in light of the 
“current 14 year-long drought,” the “most extreme drought since measurements be-
gan in the 1900s.”12 This Note will explore the legal conflicts that follow from the 
Compact’s inability to plan for this extreme water shortage, particularly as it relates 
to California water law. Furthermore, it will analyze the legal implications of altering 
water rights now in order to meet civilian needs in the face of an environmental crisis. 
Part I will provide a history of water rights in California. Part II will analyze the law 
surrounding the Colorado River. Part III will address how these areas of law and how 
various facets of life in the west, and in particular in California, are implicated by the 
severe drought in the West. Finally, Part IV will argue that local and regional com-
munities must work together to clarify the “Law of the River,” and work toward sus-
tainable solutions to a persisting lack of resources. Rather than amending the Com-
pact, states should seek to clarify its provisions. As the river’s use has developed 
from agriculture to hydroelectric power, the relative interests of the states have grad-
ually shifted.13 This Note will discuss the implications of the drought on power use 
and how this shift in use has affected the states involved in the Colorado River Com-
pact. Furthermore, this Note will discuss how these lessons may translate to other 
situations. It will concentrate on the effects of the Colorado River shortage in Cali-
fornia, and discuss the lessons that the Law of the River may teach California as it 
moves forward in the face of the drought.  
II. HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS 
Water law in California is categorized as a “dual system,” as it is composed of 
both of the fundamental water rights doctrines used throughout the United States: the 
riparian system used by the eastern states and the prior appropriation doctrine used 
by the western states.14 Riparian rights are rights given to land that is “contiguous to 
the source stream in which the right is claimed.”15 Such rights are “paramount.”16 As 
such, these rights must be satisfied before other classes of rights are considered. Ri-
parian rights are not quantified by date or amount of use.17 Rather, they are “correl-
ative,” and must account for all “reasonable and beneficial uses upon riparian 
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lands.”18 Despite the priority of riparian rights in California, the state is largely dom-
inated by the prior appropriation doctrine, which has been adopted by 19 of the west-
ern states.19   
Under the system of prior appropriation, an individual may apply for a water 
right if he or she demonstrates intent to appropriate water and if he or she makes a 
diversion of water from its natural source.20 Furthermore, the individual must apply 
the water to a beneficial use without waste.21 In this way, non-use of a water right 
can lead to an abandonment of that right.22 Once these criteria have been met, and 
individual may establish a right to the amount of water appropriated at that time. Prior 
appropriation is characterized by a “hierarchy of water rights,” which favors “senior” 
water rights holders, individuals with older claims to the resource.23 Thus, in in-
stances of water shortage, individuals with more senior water rights are given their 
full water allocation before “junior” water rights holders are given what remains.  
California began assigning appropriative water rights when it enacted the Water 
Commission Act in 1914.24 This act established the state water board, which was 
given the power to issue permits to water rights holders and issue injunctions or civil 
penalties to those who used unauthorized diversions of water.25 People who owned 
water rights before this time were traditionally “believed to be immune to cutbacks” 
and deemed to have “senior water rights.”26 Nevertheless, after “four dry years” in 
the current crisis, senior water rights owners with claims between 1903 and 1914 in 
the Sacramento River watershed and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta were 
temporarily asked to cut back on their water use.27 
In 1928, California built upon this legal structure by passing a constitutional 
amendment, which preserved riparian rights and prohibited the waste of water28. The 
1928 amendment provided that insofar as the waste of water is unreasonable, it is not 
part of a water right. This determination depends on the circumstances of each par-
ticular case, as well as the changing concept of reasonableness over time.29 
In light of legislation passed to clarify the method of obtaining and losing water 
rights, it is important to note that water rights are property rights.30 As such, two 
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types of property disputes have developed regarding water legislation.31 First, “what-
ever uses an appropriator has been making, and that have been recognized as lawful 
in the past, must as a matter of property right be permitted to continue or be compen-
sated as a taking.”32 Most states do not enforce waste laws strictly, finding it more 
efficient to allow individuals to buy and sell water according to its optimal use. The 
second kind of dispute arises when existing appropriators are asked to give up some 
water. In this situation, appropriators may claim that requiring reduced use consti-
tutes “the most blatant sort of taking without compensation.”33 
Nevertheless, water rights are less protected than other property rights.34 This is 
largely due to situations where there are original public claims or uses, or laws pro-
tecting commons.35 Although California maintains the “old” appropriative rights of 
those who claimed the rights before 1914, and although appropriative water rights 
issued in conjunction with the Water Commission Act and California Water Code 
have “statutory sanction” and “benefit of a title document,” these rights depend 
largely upon determinations of “reasonableness” and the public trust.36 Indeed, while 
riparian rights are determined by reasonableness on an “ad hoc basis,” appropriative 
rights are issued once the water board has made a determination of what is in the 
public interest.37  
Water rights are further restricted by “their original definition,” which is “limited 
to beneficial and non-wasteful uses.”38 Indeed, these rights are subject to forfeiture 
if they are deemed wasteful or if they are no longer put to use. This is a more limiting 
constraint than that on other property. Finally, this can be attributed to the fact that 
water rights “are granted by permit” and as such are subject to the constraints of those 
permits.39  
III. COLORADO RIVER LAW 
The Colorado River “is the drainage for about one-twelfth of the continental 
United States.”40 It collects water from the Rocky Mountains in Wyoming and Col-
orado, the “Uintas of Utah,” the “San Juans in Colorado,” and runoff from flash 
floods in Arizona; it carries this supply to “parts of all seven states it touches” and 
flows into Mexico for approximately one hundred miles.41 This water, highly valued 
in the dry western states, serves competing demands by providing resources to fam-
ily-owned ranches, corporate-owned farm operations, ski areas, mountain towns, and 
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“homes and industries in sprawling cities far from the River’s natural reach.”42  
As a result of these competing uses, “the history of the Colorado is a history of 
conflict.”43 Indeed, without the resources of the Colorado River, “a state may be con-
demned to desert and destitution.”44  Nevertheless, much of the conflict has been 
legally resolved by a series of “compacts, statutes, and court decisions known as the 
Law of the River.”45  
Many agreements help navigate the use of the Colorado River. For example, con-
flict between the Upper Basin states has been addressed by the Upper Colorado River 
Compact of 1948, while conflict between the Lower Basin states has been addressed 
by Arizona v. California.46 Moreover, conflict between the United States and the Re-
public of Mexico was addressed in the Treaty of Mexico Respecting Utilization of 
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande.47 Among these 
compromises, the Colorado River Compact of 1922 stands out as a landmark agree-
ment governing the use of the river’s resources between the Upper Basin and Lower 
Basin.48 As such, this Note will focus on the Colorado River Compact and the poli-
cies and agreements that have used it as a cornerstone in arranging water rights in the 
western United States.  
The Colorado River Compact was created in 1922.49 Prior to 1922, the Supreme 
Court applied the doctrine of prior appropriation to a case regarding water rights be-
tween Colorado and Wyoming, two states that used prior appropriation as a means 
of allocating water. At the time the Compact was signed, Upper Basin states feared 
that if water rights continued to be governed by prior appropriation, they would re-
ceive very little water because of the prior appropriations of the arid Lower Basin 
states. Thus, one motivation for the Compact was to ensure that Lower Basin states 
such as California and Arizona would not monopolize water rights by establishing 
“legal priorities.”50  
In 1922, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyo-
ming entered into the Colorado River Compact, which was approved by Congress.51 
This Compact took 6 years for the party states to ratify. In fact, Utah did not ratify 
the Compact until after Congress approved the six-state Compact in 1928. Utah 
signed one year later, and Arizona did not ratify the agreement until 1944.52 As a 
statute, the Compact did not take effect until it was “approved by the Legislatures of 
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each of the signatory states” and ratified by Congress in August of 1921.53 Moreover, 
the Compact maintains components of a contract, for it was agreed to by the governor 
of each state party, as well as President Hoover, who served as the representative of 
the United States. As Article X of the Compact explains, the agreement “may be 
terminated at any time by unanimous agreement of the signatory states. In the event 
of such termination, all rights established under it shall continue unimpaired.”54 
In the Compact, the states agreed to an equitable division and appropriation of 
water from the Colorado River System. The agreement divided the River System into 
the “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin,” and allocated rights to each basin based on 
water levels in 1922. Indeed, article III of the Compact allocated each basin 7,500,000 
acre-feet of water per year for their beneficial consumptive use. The Compact in-
structed that this amount “shall include all water necessary for the supply of any 
rights which may now exist.”55 Moreover, it specified that the allocation of water to 
each basin only pertained to water that could “reasonably be applied to domestic and 
agricultural uses.”56 The Compact further allocated water rights by states, dividing 
the participating states into the “Upper Division” and the “Lower Division.” 
What is more, Article III provided that Mexico would receive the surplus water 
that was not previously allocated to the states in the agreement. It explains that water 
allocated to Mexico “shall be supplied first from the waters which are surplus.”57 In 
years where the surplus will not provide a sufficient amount, “the burden of such 
deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin.”58 
In general, the Compact applies the doctrine of equitable apportionment to its 
state parties.59 Furthermore, “[i]t permits one state to make temporary use of water 
originating in a less fully developed state, but provides that uses in excess of the 
apportionment are subject to termination when the latter state needs the water.”60  
Charles Meyers outlines five of the controversies that exist regarding the appor-
tionment of Colorado River water. He first explains that the Compact apportions wa-
ter according to “beneficial consumptive use,” though there is no universal standard 
for how to measure this term.61 Second, he points out the difficulty in determining a 
“priority for releases of water for electric power generation.”62 Next, he notes the 
difficulty in meeting water obligations to Mexico, and the difficulty in determining 
what quality of water the Upper basin must deliver to the Lower basin and Mexico.63 
Finally, he points to the difficulty in determining the proper procedure in accounting 
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for groundwater.64  
First, the dispute over the definition of “beneficial” use divides the Upper and 
Lower Basins. While Upper Basin States define beneficial use using a “net depletion” 
formula, the Lower Basin states classify “consumptive use as ‘diversions less returns 
to the river.’”65 This distinction is significant because the Upper Basin accounts for 
the nature of the river as a “wasting stream,” a “stream that loses water as it flows;” 
in this way, the Upper Basin “doesn’t charge users for water they apply to beneficial 
use if the water would have been lost anyway in a state of nature.”66 Conversely, the 
Lower Basin definition defines use in terms of only the man-made, not nature-made, 
depletions of the water. This definition would require the Upper Basin to deliver more 
water to the Lower Basin than the definition put forth by the Upper Basin. As Meyers 
explains, this discrepancy in definitions stems from the lack of interpretation of Ar-
ticle III of the Compact, where “beneficial use” is discussed but not defined.67 He 
notes, “this dispute over the meaning of consumptive use must be resolved. . .in con-
struing” Article III(a),(b), and (c) of the Compact.68 
Second, the release of water for the generation of hydroelectric power is an area 
of tension between the basins. As Article III(e) dictates, water cannot be used by the 
Lower Basin, nor can it be withheld by the Upper Basin, unless it can be applied to 
“domestic and agricultural” uses, which includes the generation of power.69 Conse-
quently, Article III(e) calls into question the extent to which the Upper Basin may 
keep water from the Lower Basin to use in dams such as the Glen Canyon Dam, 
instead. While this is debated, it is ultimately the decision of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Upper and Lower Basin states worked to resolve their issues regarding 
this provision when they worked to form an operating agreement for the Glen Canyon 
and Hoover Dams. The operating agreement “directs the Secretary of the Interior to 
promulgate ‘equitable criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of the reser-
voirs.’”70 
Third, Meyers points to ambiguities in Article III(c) regarding the treaty with 
Mexico.71 Article III did not indicate which conditions constitute a “deficiency” in 
water provided to Mexico, but it explained that both basins would be equally respon-
sible in providing water in such an event.72 In fact, when the Compact is interpreted 
literally, a deficiency may be considered any amount less than sixteen million acre-
feet of consumptive use.73  This means that under the terms of the Compact, there 
may be a “deficiency” even when both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin are 
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receiving their full allotment. Moreover, the Compact did not specify the amount of 
water that the Upper Basin must supply in such an event.74 Finally, the Compact 
leaves confusion regarding how often the Upper Basin will be responsible for deliv-
ering a portion of water to Mexico. While the provision detailing allocation of water 
between the basins calculates water levels “in continuous periods of ten years,” the 
Mexican treaty “requires annual deliveries.”75 This discrepancy makes it unclear 
whether the surplus from one year may carry into the next. In years of extreme short-
age, an inability to count past surpluses increases the burden that the Upper and 
Lower Basins face.76  
Fourth, the Compact fails to fully consider the issue of water quality in the 
river.77 There is no explicit provision in the Compact regarding water quality; rather, 
it speaks only of the delivery of certain amounts of water.78 Nevertheless, as this 
water is to be put to beneficial consumptive use, it may be important to regard the 
condition it is in when it is put to domestic and agricultural purposes.79 This failing 
of the Compact has not translated into a dispute between the Upper and Lower Ba-
sins, but it may become a problem if the Upper Basin increases its use of water to an 
extent that increases the Lower Basin’s dependence on recycled water.80 
Finally, Meyers points to the Compact’s failure to address the allocation of 
groundwater. The Compact does not have a provision that expressly discusses 
groundwater. Article III, which determines the distribution of water, does not explic-
itly account for groundwater; this complicates matters insofar as groundwater and 
surface water are “often hydraulically inseparable.”81 Although there is no definitive 
answer to this problem, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California “treated con-
sumption of groundwater as a use to be charged.”82  
All five of these issues are exacerbated in times of water shortage, when distri-
bution and quality of water become particularly important. California in particular 
has been allotted 4.4 million acre-feet per year of the Colorado River’s water sup-
ply.83 This amounts to around thirty percent of the river’s allocated water, but as 
California’s water needs continue to grow, this amount “has proven to be insuffi-
cient” for the needs of the state’s “families and farmers.”84 As the Southern California 
Water Committee has explained, this allocation causes “instability for our state’s wa-
ter supply.”85  
There has been remarkably little interpretation of the Compact in the years that 
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followed its formation in 1922. Nevertheless, one landmark case helps explain some 
of the terms of the Compact. In Arizona v. California, the court issued a declaration 
that helped to clarify some of the terms of the terms of the Compact.86 Moving for-
ward, when individual states such as California address their dire need for water in 
the face of a long-term drought, it is important not only to look to methods of water 
conservation and efficient use, but also to reexamine which of these ambiguous terms 
may yield the best outcomes for the state. In order for states to collaborate in the face 
of a water shortage, it is therefore all the more important to resolve these areas of 
ambiguity.  
IV. DROUGHT, THE COLORADO RIVER, AND CALIFORNIA 
The flow of the Colorado River is “extremely erratic.”87 Reaching a high of 19.2 
million acre-feet (maf) in 1929, it averaged 16.5 million acre-feet between 1896 and 
1963.88 Despite this erratic flow, the Compact was decided at “a time when the region 
was going through an unusually wet period.”89 Notably, state allotments do not 
change as water levels change; as a result, some states are affected by periods of 
drought more than others.90  
In particular, the Upper Basin is restricted more than the Lower Basin when fac-
ing water shortages. The Compact requires the Upper Basin to deliver 7.5 million 
acre-feet of water to the Lower Basin each year.91 This is different from requiring the 
Upper and Lower Basins to divide water equally. If they divided water equally, both 
basins would divide the impact of a water shortage. Instead, in years of shortage, this 
7.5 million acre-feet of water must be delivered to the Lower Basin even if this means 
the Upper Basin will retain less than their 7.5 million acre-feet share.  
Nevertheless, Lower Basin states, which have grown accustomed to the “‘sur-
plus’ water flowing downstream from the [U]pper [B]asin,” suffer when there is no 
surplus available.92 These arid states must learn to adjust to their reduced water sup-
plies as well. In California, this particularly affects the agricultural and urban health 
of the arid communities in the south.  
In order to deal with the uneven flow of water from month to month and year to 
year, the communities of the Colorado River Basin erected dams upon the two prom-
inent lakes of the Colorado River. Situated on Lake Mead and Lake Powell, two lakes 
along the Colorado River, the “Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams were built to regulate 
and even out this variable supply.”93 The Glen Canyon Dam provides enough water 
 
 86.  See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (confirming the amount of water allocated 
to each state under the Colorado River Compact). 
 87.  Meyers, supra note 44, at 9. 
 88.  Robert W. Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 19, 30 (2008); Meyers, supra note 44, at 9. 
 89.  Alicia Acuna & Kelly David Burke, Colorado to California: Hands Off Our Water, FOX NEWS (Jan. 
28, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/28/colorado-to-california-hands-off-our-water.html. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Adler, supra note 88, at 28. 
 92.  Id. at 29. 
 93.  Meyers, supra note 44, at 9. 
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storage for the Upper Basin to meet its delivery requirements to the Lower Basin, 
while the Hoover Dam helps the Bureau of Reclamation to meet other water delivery 
needs to customers along the “entire reach of the river, including Mexico.”94 Initially 
constructed to even out the short term discrepancies in water flow from the summer 
to the winter, these dams are critical elements in governing the relations between the 
Upper and Lower Basins by regulating the water flow over years and even decades.  
In addition to regulating the variable water supply, the Hoover and Glen Canyon 
Dams serve as important sources of energy to the western states. Built in 1936 and 
aided by hydropower, the Hoover Dam helps satisfy “peak-demand electricity for 
Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and other southwestern cities.”95 Receiving its water from 
Lake Mead, the Hoover Dam’s electricity is greatly diminished by reduced water 
levels in the lake caused by the drought. Lake Mead’s water level has dropped over 
130 feet since 1999.96 As a result, the Hoover Dam’s output “has been significantly 
curtailed.”97  In fact, the output fell from a normal level of 2,074 megawats to 1,592 
megawats by July of 2014. If Lake Mead’s water level continues to drop, there could 
be severe repercussions for the Lower Basin states.98 If water levels drop to 1,075 
feet, “rationing begins,” and if they drop to 1,050 feet, “the uppermost water intake 
for Las Vegas shuts down.”99 Thus, even though the Lower Basin appears to benefit 
from the provisions of the Compact, insofar as it allows them to “call” upon the Upper 
Basin for a disproportionate amount of water, the implications of water shortage in 
the context of the dams demonstrates that the desert-like nature of the Lower Basin 
states puts them at a significant risk when water levels fall.  
Similarly, the Glen Canyon Dam produces a significant amount of hydropower, 
serving as the “largest hydropower producer in the Reclamation’s Colorado River 
Storage Project.”100 The Glen Canyon Dam receives water from Lake Powell, and 
when water levels drop below 3,490 feet above sea level, or 100 feet below its water 
level as it did in August of 2013, “vortex action would draw air into the turbines and 
damage them.”101 At this level, generators that supply enough electricity to power 
350,000 homes would shut down.102 
Thus, as Lake Mead and Lake Powell experience reduced water levels, and the 
Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams are unable to produce past amounts of electricity, 
states such as California are forced to look elsewhere for their power supply. Califor-
nia receives hydroelectric power from three other lakes in addition to the power it 
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receives from the lakes of the Colorado River: Lake Shasta, Lake Oroville, and Fol-
som Lake.103 These lakes, which have reached only forty-one percent, forty-seven 
percent, and sixty-two percent of their capacity respectively, are unable to make up 
for a loss in power from the dams of the Colorado River.104 Previously accounting 
for twenty percent of California’s energy supply, their capacity fell to ten percent in 
2014.105 As a result, the state has begun to purchase more of its energy and rely more 
heavily on thermal power.106 Going forward, California must continue to invest in 
these alternate sources of energy for studies indicate that even a short-term rise in 
water levels may be short-lived.  
Legally, the Upper Basin states bear the brunt of water shortages, not only be-
cause they have less natural access to water and because of the provisions of Article 
III of the Compact, but also because they have less capacity to store water. Indeed, 
the Upper Basin states have access to only forty percent of stored water.107 David 
Getches argues that this limited access to storage should be read into the interpreta-
tion of the Compact, implying that other measures must be taken to ensure that both 
basins maintain their roughly equal allotments. As he explained, “[t]he ultimate prob-
lem for the Upper Basin is how to build a future on the right to leftovers.”108 Indeed, 
“[i]f the upper basin cannot make its compact deliveries to the lower basin, the lower 
basin can enact a ‘call’,” meaning that the “upper basin has to cut off all its uses until 
it has delivered to the lower basin the amount that it committed to in 1922.”109 In this 
way, Getches’s view benefits the Upper Basin but at a cost to the Lower Basin. Thus, 
he demonstrates the manner in which an interpretation of terms in the Compact could 
have a vast affect on an array of communities depending on this water.  
More than relations between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, a shortage in 
Colorado River water affects the relationships between individual states. For exam-
ple, as California faces water shortages in the Colorado River as well as its other 
rivers in the Northern half of the state, it might choose to lean on Arizona to maintain 
its water supply. In the 1960s, California legislators “demanded first dibs on lower-
basin water as a condition for supporting federal legislation to build the Central-Ari-
zona Project,” a “web of canals irrigating” Arizona’s farms and cities.110 Thus, in a 
water shortage, California may face a relatively small fraction of rationing in com-
parison to what Arizona would endure. As a result, the Central Arizona project, which 
was designed to prevent farmers from over-pumping groundwater, would lose reve-
nue from selling water. This in turn would force farmers to return to their practice of 
groundwater pumping. This issue contributes to the pre-existing issues of the Com-
pact, especially its inability to establish how groundwater should be treated. Moreo-
ver, the over-pumping of groundwater could have lasting effects on Arizona and the 
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Southwest United States, for it could take a number of years to replenish these re-
sources once depleted.  
Furthermore, the water shortage can affect relationships between individual 
states that belong to different basins. For example, while some states face a water 
shortage, other states such as Colorado have more water than they need. Such dis-
crepancies can cause conflict between the states. Although Colorado has previously 
permitted California to “dip into its surplus,” modern water plans in Colorado call 
for surplus water to be saved for the future.111 In fact, the director of the Colorado 
Water Conservation board gave a statement that highlighted the tensions between the 
states regarding this prized resource. In an interview with the Associated Press, he 
stated, “If anybody thought we were going to roll over and say, ‘OK, California, 
you’re in a really bad drought, you get to use the water that we were going to use,’ 
they’re mistaken.”112 Although he clarified that this statement was not an attempt to 
flex his muscle, it nevertheless represents Colorado’s intention to maintain its allo-
cation requirements provided by the 1922 Compact. Even though the state itself is 
not facing a drought, it intends to store as much water as the 1922 Compact permits, 
in order to prepare for the future rather than “spread the wealth.”113 This provides a 
source of conflict between Colorado and California, a state that is facing one of the 
most severe droughts of a century.  
The effects of a drought have implications not only on the relations between 
states but also on the relationship between the United States and Mexico. The Mexi-
can treaty regarding the Colorado River promises to deliver 1,500,000 acre-feet to 
Mexico annually. Article III(c) of the Compact stipulates that “if any Mexican rights 
could not be adequately supplied from ‘surplus,’ the Upper and Lower Basins would 
be obliged to share the burdens equally.”114 It is unclear what is meant by “surplus,” 
but it is thought to mean the amount of water that exceeds the allotted 16,000,000 
acre-feet a year allotted to the Upper and Lower Basins, combined. Such a lack of 
water poses a risk to the Lower Basin, which would be required to supplement the 
amount of water that reached Mexico. Therefore, in order to protect the lower basin 
in this situation, the Upper Basin would be allowed to store up to their original water 
allotment only if such water went to reasonable applications of domestic and agricul-
tural use.  
At the time of the agreement, the hydrological record, or the record of water 
flows, was not “entirely reliable,” and did not account for the entire life cycle of the 
Southwest climate.115 Thus, although sixteen million acre feet may have seemed like 
an appropriate water level on which to base the agreement, subsequent decades have 
manifested a consistently lower water level.116 As Adler explains, “The average flow 
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from 1896 to 2004 was less than fifteen maf.”117 Between 1922 and 1982, this aver-
age dropped to just over fouteen maf.118 Most significantly, severe drought condi-
tions have “persisted since 1999.”119 In fact, water levels were below the average 
every year between 2000 and 2007 except in 2006.120   
Moreover, scientists looked to tree rings to evaluate the long-term climate history 
of the area surrounding the Colorado River. These rings indicated droughts that were 
more severe and lasted longer than any drought of the Twentieth Century. This evi-
dence of long-term droughts points to the serious probability that water levels will 
not return to the sixteen million acre-feet for many years, if they do at all. What is 
more, water shortages may be exacerbated by climate change. In fact, some predict a 
forty-five percent decline in water flow by 2060.121 As such, the difficulties caused 
by this drought must not be discarded as temporary problems that will be fixed by 
short-term solutions. In fact, the Bureau of Reclamation has “predicted that Lakes 
Powell and Mead may never again be full.”122 Thus, rather than searching for a quick 
fix to this problem, states affected by the water shortage in the Colorado River must 
search for solutions that will continue to address this problem on a larger scale.  
V. MOVING FORWARD - COLLABORATING FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
Thus far, this Note has discussed both the water law in California and the “Law 
of the River,” which pertains to the entire Colorado River Basin. As the Colorado 
River Compact affects the amount of water that California receives, it indirectly im-
plicates water rights within the State. It is important to analyze the manner in which 
the Law of the River impacts California Water law, for this will have far reaching 
affects on the agricultural life of the state, as well as the day-to-day lives of individ-
uals in urban areas. California’s reaction to its reduced water supply will have legal 
implications, for the state must decide how much weight to give to the “public inter-
est” when it attempts to affect senior water rights. Most significantly, the drought 
will affect the lives of individuals in small communities who have seen their water 
resources completely depleted as a result of their lack of groundwater as well as water 
that had previously been delivered to them. For these reasons, it is necessary to assess 
the best manner of approaching the Law of the River moving forward. At this time 
of great change in the environment of the area, California would do well to learn 
from, and build off, collaborative efforts on local and regional levels.  
During the course of the current drought, numerous levels of government have 
worked together to attempt to alleviate the crisis. Administrative guidelines, interna-
tional agreements, and discussion in the Senate are just some of the ways in which 
government entities have searched for solutions to this problem. As an actor in these 
agreements, California may learn from and build upon the progress that has been 
made to address the problems brought by the water crisis in the state.  
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On December 13, 2007, the Secretary of the Interior signed “Interim Guidelines 
for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operation for Lake Powell and Lake 
Mead,”123 an “historic decision that will implement innovative strategies for Colo-
rado River management.”124 At this point, the Colorado River Basin was only in its 
eighth year of drought, but even at that point it was deemed “the worst eight year 
period in over a century.”125  
In order to create these guidelines, the Secretary charged the Bureau of Recla-
mation with the duty of preparing an Environmental Impact Statement, a report re-
quired by the National Environmental Policy Act, to assess the environmental effects 
of proposed guidelines. This Environmental Impact Statement required input from 
the public living along and affected by the River Basin. In the end, the Secretary of 
the Interior recommended guidelines that will remain in effect through 2025. These 
guidelines include the coordinated operation of Lake Mead and Lake Powell to the 
end of avoiding curtailments of the Upper Basin Supply as well as shortages of the 
Lower Basin Supply.  
Further, they called for a “mechanism to encourage and account for augmenta-
tion and conservation of water supplies, referred to as Intentionally Created Surplus 
(ICS),” to “minimize the likelihood of future shortages,” and the “modification and 
extension” of 2001 interim guidelines through 2026. Finally, the guidelines propose 
that “discrete levels of shortage volumes” be associated with Lake Mead elevations 
so that parties in the Lower Basin will have more certainty about “when, and by how 
much, water deliveries will be reduced in the drought . . . .”126 
The theme of collaboration continued in 2012 when the United States and Mex-
ico struck an agreement regarding water storage in Lake Mead. This five-year agree-
ment permitted Mexico to continue storing water in Lake Mead, provided that certain 
water providers from the United States could purchase some of the water conserved 
by Mexico’s efforts to improve its “canals and other storage infrastructure.”127 Mex-
ico will employ the profit from this sale to continue to develop its infrastructure and 
to improve the habitat in Mexico’s Colorado River Delta.  
This agreement also requires Mexico to give up some of its water in Lake Mead 
when water levels drop below 1,075 feet, but provides that Mexico will receive some 
of the surplus when the water levels rise.128 In this way, the agreement between the 
United States and Mexico serves as an example of international collaboration aimed 
at creating sustainable solutions to the water crisis in the Colorado River Basin. It 
also demonstrates the way in which economic solutions can help to alleviate political 
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and environmental problems.  
Further efforts at collaboration were demonstrated in the Senate in 2013. In 2013, 
the Subcommittee on Water and Power, a subcommittee of the Senate’s Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources, conducted a hearing regarding the Aging Water 
Infrastructure in the West.129 Moreover, at an oversight hearing regarding the Colo-
rado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Tanya Trujillo, the executive 
director of the Colorado River Board of California, was given the opportunity to 
speak for California. Her testimony focused on the critical need for addressing water 
conservation using multiple approach, for “no single solution will be sufficient to 
meet the future potential water demand . . . .”130 She emphasized the need for creative 
solutions and continued collaboration between the states as tensions continue to 
build.131  
In her testimony, Trujillo mentioned California’s efforts to not only conserve 
water, but to recycle and reuse groundwater “to supplement water supplies.”132 Em-
phasizing the need for collaboration amidst the search of sustainable solutions, Tru-
jillo also identified multiple groups designated to evaluate existing programs: the 
Healthy Flows Workgroup, the Municipal and Industrial Conservation and Reuse 
Workgroup, and the Agricultural Conservation and Transfers Workgroup, among 
others.133  
These efforts not only demonstrate the need for collaboration in finding solutions 
to the water crisis in the Colorado River Basin, but they also demonstrate the need 
for creativity in finding a solution. Law regarding the Colorado River has been stable 
for decades. Over time, as more communities and laws base themselves around the 
premise of the Colorado River Compact, it becomes more and more entrenched in 
the law and live of those in the West. Commonly referred to as “The Law of the 
River,” the Compact involves water law that contains not only local, but also state 
and nation-wide layers, which all develop slightly different methods of allocating 
water.134   
Renegotiation of the Compact would not only require collaboration of the seven 
Compact States, but would also require further collaboration with the United States 
and Mexico.135 The Compact’s mixed attributes of both contract and legislation fur-
ther complicate a potential amendment process. When initially created, the Compact 
was signed by representatives from all seven states.136 Nevertheless, the agreement 
was not ratified by all seven state legislatures for an additional seven years.137 The 
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Compact itself seems built to resist significant change.138 Article X of the Compact 
states that “[t]his compact may be terminated at any time by the unanimous agree-
ment of the signatory states.  In the event of such termination all rights established 
under it shall continue unimpaired.”139 
In addition to the legal difficulties in changing the Compact, numerous political 
and social changes make substantive change seem nearly prohibitive. Indeed, as Rob-
ert Adler explains, the Compact and all the agreements that rely on it are deeply relied 
upon by a vast array of private and public parties.140 If this agreement were signifi-
cantly altered, it would “prompt cries of significant unfairness and adverse economic 
and other consequences.”141 It would impact “the well-being of millions of residents, 
the economy of the entire Southwest, international relations with Mexico, and the 
health of ecosystems throughout the Colorado River basin.”142 
Nevertheless, the Compact continues to exhibit flaws that make finding solutions 
to the crisis more difficult for members of both the Upper and Lower Basins. Vague 
definitions of “beneficial use,” terms regarding the delivery of water to Mexico and 
the Lower Basin, and the absence of a distinction between groundwater and surface 
water serve as legal challenges that inhibit collaboration. These defects affect Cali-
fornia by leaving uncertainty as to the amount of water it is allocated. While Califor-
nia must compete with other Lower Basin states for their share of allocated water, it 
must also collaborate with them, and with the Upper Basin states, to ensure that Lake 
Mead and Lake Powell sustain water levels that will support hydroelectricity. Clarity 
in the area of “beneficial use” would help the state work with other Lower Basin 
states to establish how much water they must receive. In the face of these defects, is 
it feasible to change the Compact or start afresh in order to correct for its flaws? 
Though not impossible in theory, throughout its history the Compact has never been 
amended.143 As evidenced by the necessity of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Environ-
mental Impact Statement when putting forth guidelines for the coming years, such an 
action would constitute major government action, and many communities would 
stand to lose their livelihoods upon a change in either direction.  
Thus, recent history has demonstrated that the best approach to future conserva-
tion methods will rely on creativity and collaboration between communities and 
states. Some steps have already been taken by the Lower Basin States to limit the 
effects of the crisis posed by the drought in the Colorado River. While San Diego has 
begun to build a desalination plant “on the Pacific shore” as a new source of water, 
others have begun to implement considerable conservation measures.144 Arizona has 
limited its water consumption to rates equaling those of 1955. One method it has 
employed is the use of laser technology to ensure that their fields are table flat; this 
is intended to increase the efficiency of water use.145  
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Furthermore, Nevada has reduced its water use by treating nearly all of the water 
used indoors so that it can be returned to Lake Mead. In California, the Southern 
California Metropolitan Water District (SCMWD) “is recycling sewage effluent” and 
subsidizing water-reducing measures such as artificial turf, “zero-water urinals,” and 
high-efficiency bathroom appliances.146  
Other collaborative efforts focus on the quality of the water received by the 
Lower Basin states. These include the Bureau of Reclamation’s Yuma Desalting 
Plant, designed to process “salty, mineralized Arizona drain water.” In an experi-
mental run between May of 2010 and March of 2011, the plant desalinated ten billion 
gallons of water. This might be one way to help the United States meet the allotment 
that it promised to Mexico.147 Although this is a small effort in relation to the problem 
as a whole, “it is an example of collaboration rather than warfare.”148 Another effort 
that reflects collaboration among the states is the Warren H. Brock Reservoir, built 
to capture water “lost downstream” on its way to Mexico.   
Moreover, the water shortage has led to statewide policies in California that have 
stirred attention in urban areas in particular. In 2015 when Governor Brown required 
urban areas in California to cut water use by twenty-five percent, this mandatory cut 
served as the first mandatory water rationing in California history.149 Agriculture 
makes up eighty percent of California’s water use, but only accounts for two percent 
of the economy.150 Nevertheless, Governor Brown defends placing a heavier burden 
of water cuts on urban areas. He explained, “Agriculture has already suffered major 
cutbacks.”151 Indeed, 400,000 acres went unplanted in 2014.152 While this historic 
rationing caused tensions between water uses in the state, a majority of urban areas 
surpassed the water rationing levels that they were required to meet during 2015.153  
Nevertheless, effects of the drought in California were far-reaching.154 Some me-
dium–sized communities in California, such as Folsom and Santa Cruz, were hit hard 
as their wells dried up and the state was forced to provide them with emergency as-
sistance.155 Moreover, surface water deliveries to farms was reduced by one-third in 
2014, leading to an increase in groundwater pumping and decreased water supply to 
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the more recent agricultural water-rights holders. This triggered “losses of more than 
$2 billion and 17,000 full- and part time jobs.”156 Further, the drought in California 
“exposed weaknesses in groundwater management.”157 Indeed, as farmers relied 
more heavily on groundwater, groundwater tables have lowered, causing the land to 
sing and damaging aqueducts and other infrastructure. In response, “new legislation 
enacted in 2014 requires local agencies with the most stressed basins to adopt sus-
tainable groundwater management plans by 2020.”158 
As the Public Policy Institute of California has noted, this crisis has “exposed 
weaknesses in the current water allocation system.”159 Not only has it exposed weak-
nesses in reporting systems used to manage water use, but it has also illuminated the 
lack of a comprehensive policy, which would ideally develop clear priorities of use 
in the event of a shortage; for example, the priority of uses between protecting public 
health and aquatic ecosystems.160 Finally, the Public Policy Institute has pointed to 
the State’s inability to fully consider the doctrines of “reasonable use” and “public 
trust.”161 These doctrines, which have been fundamental in California water law, re-
quire the state to consider the effect of water allocation on water quality, fisheries, 
and ecosystems, and to protect various uses to the greatest extent possible.  
Although the drought has taught California about areas for improvement in its 
water allocation system and water law, these problems are exacerbated by the na-
tional crisis in the Colorado River. In fact, water shortage in California is not a novel 
problem, but rather one that has been developing for years. In the years before the 
current drought, Southern California utilized the surplus water not allocated by the 
Colorado River Compact to supply its “growing coastal cities.”162 In 2001, as the 
surplus began to diminish and as other southwestern states began to employ the sur-
plus waters of the Colorado, California was forced to develop a plan to reduce its use 
by January of 2003.163 The 2001 conflict in the House of Representatives has roots 
in California v. Arizona, which paved the way for the Central Arizona Project, the 
first significant limitation on California’s claim to surplus water from the Colorado 
River.164  
Despite the efforts individual states have taken to manage the crisis, more col-
laborative efforts would better help to create a sustainable solution for a consistently 
lower water level in the Colorado River. As Jennifer Gimbel of the Colorado River 
Conservation Board explained to Congress in a 2010 hearing, “[h]istory has shown 
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that collaboration is a necessary ingredient for action in the Colorado River Basin.”165 
Moreover, David Getches posits that in the face of the changing use of the river’s 
water, decisions will be made less by the courts and more by interstate cooperation 
in the face of economic arrangements.166 Further, he argues that this will encourage 
a more efficient use of resources, especially as the value of water increases.167  
Because basin states are hesitant to depart from the “Law of the River” in finding 
new solutions, and although a “Lower Basin Agreement would be a tacit recognition 
of the validity of the Compact,” such a contractual arrangement would be unlikely to 
succeed without the consent of all of the states that were party to the Compact.168 
Thus, they would do better to increase water efficiency through collaborative, and 
economic, solutions. In particular, the states in the Colorado River Basin may con-
sider water banking as one way to increase the efficient use of water.169  A water 
bank allows “willing owners of water to lease water to the ‘bank’ for re-lease to 
‘renters’ on a short term basis.”170 States may implement some form of leasing 
scheme as a way to collaborate more closely between Upper Basin and Lower Basin 
states.171 This idea serves an intra-state benefit as well. California would do well to 
increase its ability to lease senior water rights. Although this may have the same ef-
fect as temporarily restricting rights for the public interest, the state may be able to 
achieve these ends more fluidly by leasing rather than taking the rights. This solution 
fits well with California’s prior appropriation scheme and the Colorado River Com-
pact, which both premise the allocation of water upon beneficial consumptive use of 
water, because it would eliminate water that was wasted by individuals, and the 
Lower Basin as a whole.   
California must consider these measures as it attempts to approach conservation 
techniques in an aggressive manner. Furthermore, California must employ its eco-
nomic power in order to negotiate with other states. As it did with Arizona upon the 
formation of the Compact, and as the United Stated did with Mexico, California may 
attempt to collaborate with Colorado in order to purchase water in a way that will be 
sustainable in the future. Just as the treaty with Mexico allows the United States to 
buy water from Mexico, which in turn uses the money to create sustainable solutions, 
Colorado’s play for sustainability may benefit from the revenue it would receive from 
the purchase of its surplus water. In these events, agreements must learn lessons from 
the pitfalls of the 1922 Compact, and learn to create agreements that do not leave 
terms such as “surplus” to future interpretation.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Colorado River Basin serves a critical role in the environments, economies, 
and survival of communities in California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Colo-
rado, and Idaho. Governed by the Colorado River Compact since 1922, the “Law of 
the River” has entrenched itself in the West over decades, as communities continue 
to use it as a foundation for their water laws and agreements. While states vary in 
their systems of water law, from riparian rights to prior appropriation, they have 
evolved to incorporate the law of the river into their systems. Unfortunately, the Col-
orado River Compact formed under false premises, producing a system that is well 
equipped to distribute water when it reaches 16.5 million acre-feet.  
 Now, faced with a dearth of resources, flaws in the foundational document serve 
as areas of contention as communities scramble to obtain whatever resources they are 
able to find. These areas of contention should not be dismissed in light of temporary 
storms such as El Nino, as even this storm has improved the conditions of the drought 
only 2% in California.172 As the Compact required the division of water for “benefi-
cial use” between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin, it pitted the two basins against 
each other, not only in deciding upon the definition of beneficial use, but also in 
addressing issues regarding how much water the Upper Basin may withhold each 
year in its reservoirs. Conflicts regarding energy and water resources are equally pre-
sent between the states within each of the Basins, who must compete for water within 
their given allotments. In this sense, the formation of the Compact, especially as it 
pertains to Arizona, demonstrates the manner in which states negotiate with each 
other for resources. In addressing these conflicts, cracks within the Colorado River 
Compact risk turning into canyons, barring collaboration between the states and re-
gions.  
 Despite these potential difficulties, no amendments have been made to the Col-
orado River Compact since 1922. Nevertheless, Arizona v. California helped to clar-
ify terms in a way that helped prevent future conflict. While some scholars believe 
that the combination of the current crisis and imprecision of key articles in the Com-
pact demonstrate a need to amend the Compact’s key terms, a wide array of govern-
ment action has pointed to the unlikelihood of this action.   
 Indeed, in the face of the worst drought in a century, and with the likelihood 
that water levels may never return to their originally evaluated amounts, local, state, 
regional, and the national government have demonstrated the desire to look for ways 
to adapt and govern with less natural resources. While the stability of the Law of the 
River provides stability for the many communities along the Colorado River Basin, 
it also makes the process of amending the foundational document nearly insurmount-
able.  
 Instead, groups have created economic and legal agreements aimed to address 
 
 172.  Jonathan Llyod, Exceptional Drought Improves only 2 Percent After California Storms, NBC LOS 
ANGELES (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california/California-Drought-El-Nino-Storms-
Rain-Snow-Water-365280731.html. In fact, more, than eighty-seven percent of California remains under severe 
drought. 
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deficiencies in past agreements going forward. These agreements range from the na-
tional to the local level. While on the national level guidelines for future use have 
been conducted through the Bureau of Reclamation and have employed administra-
tive law to enlist the input of the community in the creation of an Environmental 
Impact Statement, movement has been made at the local level as well.  
 Moving forward, California may learn not only from the creation of the Com-
pact, but also from the modern efforts at collaboration, as it seeks to address its water 
crisis. California is affected by the drought and the water shortage in the Colorado 
River in a number of ways. Normally dependent on the surplus of water given to the 
Lower Basin for agriculture and for the functioning of its arid Southern California 
cities, California must adapt to a consistently lower input of water into these commu-
nities. Moreover, when Lake Mead and Lake Powell are not able to sustain the dams 
that provide the state with hydroelectricity, the entire state must turn to other areas of 
energy. In this way, California’s policies are affected both directly and indirectly by 
the water shortage in the Colorado River Basin.  
 This affects water law in California in a myriad of ways. Amidst efforts to con-
serve waters and protect agriculture, urban citizens have been asked to reduce their 
consumption of water. Dams that depend on tributaries of the Colorado struggle to 
produce energy, and senior water rights holders have seen their water rights tempo-
rarily suspended as a result. This calls into question the importance of the provisions 
in California water law to regulate water for the “public benefit” or the “public trust.” 
Thus, in this way, the legal ramifications of the drought are far reaching.  
 With these legal ramifications in mind, California may look to existing methods 
as it moves forward in the drought. Currently in the state, water rationing, desalina-
tion plants, and efforts to improve the efficiency of water storage and transportation 
serve as some local attempts to use water most efficiently. Other states such as Ari-
zona have implemented agricultural techniques that allow them to use water most 
efficiently. California may build off of these attempts on a larger scale if it considers 
collaborative efforts such as water banking, both within the state and with other 
states.  
 In particular, California may learn from its history with Arizona, and from its 
recent agreement with Mexico regarding Lake Mead Water Storage, that it should 
work closely with Upper Basin states such as Colorado to find a sustainable and mu-
tually beneficent use of its surplus water. Not only will these measures to increase 
sustainability benefit California as a state, but it will also benefit the Lower Basin as 
a whole, by increasing the proportion of water that it puts to beneficial consumptive 
use. Although the Colorado River Compact of displays a number of flaws, it serves 
as a stable foundation for a vast number of communities. In the face of crisis, when 
lives and economies of entire communities are at stake, it is best to move forward 
together with this unique piece of law rather than using it as a tool to pit communities 
against one another. Over time, as water use as evolved from a primarily agricultural 
resource to a resource that provides energy to urban areas, the use of water changed 
the demand of water in the river. Now, efforts to find new sources of energy and to 
use water more efficiently must continue this trend in response to changes in the river. 
 
